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Electronic data reporting from public health laboratories to a central site pro-
vides a mechanism for public health officials to rapidly identify problems and
take action to prevent further spread of disease. However, implementation of
reference laboratory systems is much more complex than simply adopting new
technology, especially in international settings. We describe three major areas
to be considered by international organizations for successful implementation
of electronic reporting systems from public health reference laboratories: bene-
fits of electronic reporting, planning for system implementation (e.g., support,
resources, data analysis, country sovereignty), and components of system initi-
ation (e.g., authority, disease definition, feedback, site selection, assessing
readiness, problem resolution). Our experience with implementation of elec-
tronic public health laboratory data management and reporting systems in the
United States and working with international organizations to initiate similar
efforts demonstrates that successful reference laboratory reporting can be
implemented if surveillance issues and components are planned.
The environment for infectious disease surveillance sys-
tems is rapidly changing, and the need to obtain current
information about diseases in a specific population is
increasing. Disease surveillance in many countries is often
fragmented or out-of-date, slow, nonstandardized, inflexible,
and not well integrated with respect to both laboratory and
epidemiology functions. Emerging diseases (1,2), changes in
antibiotic resistance (3), and threats of terrorism with bio-
logic agents (4) have heightened the awareness of surveil-
lance needs worldwide. In this environment, public health
officials in many countries desire to improve their surveil-
lance for infectious diseases and look to electronic reporting
systems to address deficiencies. Indeed, electronic data
reporting from public health laboratories to a national-level
surveillance database provides a means for public health
officials to identify problems rapidly and take action to pre-
vent further spread of disease (5). However, implementing
an electronic surveillance system is considerably more com-
plex than simply applying new technology. Issues such as
personnel, funding, politics, and public health policies also
must be taken into account.
Well before adopting an electronic surveillance system,
those involved in planning it may want to address issues
regarding public health systems in general and how these
apply specifically to their own country or laboratory. For
example, laboratory methods for characterizing and subtyp-
ing agents are rapidly changing; new technologies for sur-
veillance can make even recent developments appear
obsolete; personnel, public health policies, and politics
change, to name a few factors. With these considerations in
mind, planners will want to consider flexible laboratory sur-
veillance systems. Planners also need to determine exactly
what the surveillance system is to accomplish, whether it is
to detect outbreaks, analyze trends, or generate hypotheses
(6-10).
Benefits of Electronic Reporting for Surveillance 
Electronic surveillance systems meet three broad sur-
veillance objectives: they generate hypotheses, monitor
trends, and detect clusters and outbreaks (11). Electronic
data transmission enables these objectives to be met very
rapidly and often more accurately than with other reporting
systems, thus extending the benefits to actually controlling
the spread of illness. While the information needs for tomor-
row and capacities to meet them can change overnight, the
underlying surveillance principles and objectives are con-
stant. 
Generating Hypotheses
One role of surveillance is to provide hypothesis-gener-
ating data (e.g., demographic characteristics of patients, risk
factors for illness, or antimicrobial resistance patterns of
infecting organisms). Surveillance databases should not be
expected to provide answers to all questions about a particu-
lar disease or topic but to comprise a minimum data set to
suggest hypotheses about events under surveillance.
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Monitoring Trends 
Surveillance systems that collect consistent data over
extended periods can provide valuable information about
spatial, temporal, and demographic changes in disease inci-
dence. For example, the emergence or reemergence of patho-
gens, changes in antimicrobial resistance, or changes in
target populations can be detected rapidly by examining
electronic surveillance data. Information on trends or pat-
terns provides a reliable basis for decision making about pre-
venting and controlling disease. 
Detecting Clusters or Outbreaks
Before the initiation of electronic reporting, surveillance
data may have signaled only that a cluster had occurred; this
signal was often of little value in outbreak control since the
outbreak may have been over before it was recognized.
Detecting clusters often depended on alert laboratorians or
epidemiologists recognizing increases in disease occurrence
on the basis of their increased workload or their memory
rather than actual data. With electronic reporting, data can
be transmitted so rapidly that an outbreak can be detected
and investigated while it is ongoing and interventions can be
implemented. Statistical evaluations of surveillance data
reported electronically can be more timely and accurate, and
they will have greater value in detecting and curtailing out-
breaks early (5,10,12-16). 
Planning
Planning might begin with general considerations on
how to address surveillance. Even at this stage, perceptions
and opinions of planners are likely to differ. The difficulty of
arriving at consensus on topics such as the appropriate flow
of data can be demonstrated by the discussions surrounding
the National Salmonella Surveillance System (17), which
have been ongoing since the system converted to an elec-
tronic format in 1990. Although it may not be possible to
bring closure to all general surveillance questions (6,18), sev-
eral need to be asked early in planning: What is appropriate
and necessary to report? Should international (regional) cen-
ters be established for receiving and distributing reports?
How can regional centers obtain participation of member
countries and ensure appropriate levels of discretion regard-
ing potentially damaging information traveling along the
network?
Planners should also research what will be required to
support an electronic surveillance reporting system in their
country. The suggestion that a country build a network for
rapid reporting, analysis, and communications is usually
received with enthusiasm (19). Later, when the resources
(including personnel) required become apparent, enthusiasm
can wane. In every case, inevitable situations exist that
could undermine a country’s ability to implement and sus-
tain a system. Obtaining software and beginning to report
without first planning and establishing the support base for
the system spells failure (6). The following issues should be
considered by all involved in planning electronic systems.
Availability of Data at All Levels
The purpose of laboratory disease surveillance is to col-
lect appropriate data for each site, analyze these data, and
act on the information in conjunction with other public
health groups. Although summary data are occasionally col-
lected, they allow for only limited analyses, and sites receiv-
ing only summary numbers have little, if any, way to
evaluate the data quality (aggregated data are less amena-
ble to editing at sites beyond the reporting site). In contrast,
data pertaining to individual disease events provide a basis
for multiple analyses, and receiving sites can develop edit
routines to detect errors in data reported. Thus, data should
be collected at a level of specificity that will provide decision
makers the information they need to take action.
Analysis of laboratory data should be encouraged at all
levels (11,18). At the local level, public health officials are
accustomed to dealing with known levels of specified dis-
eases and are more likely to detect an abrupt change in fre-
quencies as their case follow-up load increases or their
demands for certain laboratory services increase. At succes-
sively broader-reaching levels of the public health system,
there is less front-line knowledge of specific local disease
events. When public health data are analyzed and inter-
preted at all participating levels and appropriate databases
are built to satisfy the needs for data at each surveillance
level (11), the interval from disease event to problem recog-
nition can be substantially reduced. This is particularly true
in the networks of international surveillance. Multinational
centers may encourage and assist ministries of health to
evaluate their data for unusual clusters and trends, and
then assimilate reports of national disease problems into
regional assessments. In the United States, for example,
reports of Salmonella isolates are examined for national out-
breaks at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) and also by personnel in state health departments for
outbreaks within states.
Continuous System Support 
An electronic reporting system needs well-defined, con-
tinued support. Experts on disease are needed to establish
surveillance relationships, definitions, and ongoing surveil-
lance; and technical experts need to establish system tools
and implement business rules (6,8,20). Two other levels of
commitment are necessary. First, personnel at the receiving
site should establish a cooperative relationship with report-
ing sites; reach agreement on disease definitions, reporting
frequencies, and data elements; and provide feedback to
reporting sites (18). Second, reporting sites should agree to
use a common surveillance reporting tool that is coordinated
and supported by the central site. At CDC, disease special-
ists (epidemiologist, laboratorians, and statisticians) work
together to accomplish the first task, while system trainers
and computer specialists manage the laboratory reporting
“help desk” to answer system questions by telephone and
visit reporting sites to provide training and answer technical
questions. The Caribbean Epidemiology Center (CAREC), a
Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) comprising 21
member countries, is an example of such an international
reporting infrastructure. The CAREC central data-receiving
site provides disease reporting specifications, training, and
support to member countries, i.e., the reporting sites.
A critical component of system support is building con-
sensus among partners. In the United States, the Council of
State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE), the Associa-
tion of Public Health Laboratories (APHL), CDC, local
health departments, and other agencies are often active
partners in developing national surveillance systems. CSTEPerspectives
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and APHL meet annually to discuss surveillance issues, sys-
tem implementation policies, and data dissemination.
CAREC meets annually for a joint meeting of laboratorians
and epidemiologists from each member country to define
surveillance directions, set policy, and develop consensus
plans.
Resource Needs
Paper-based systems require resources for data process-
ing (encoding, editing, and data input), reporting, and stor-
age. In contrast, electronic reporting imposes the additional
larger burden of training (21), technical assistance, and
hardware requirements (Table 1). Resources to sustain a ref-
erence laboratory reporting system vary by site and depend
on such factors as number of diseases reported, complexity of
the system, and number of sites involved
.
Resource requirements for electronic surveillance may
have the largest impact on three areas: personnel, funding,
and workload. Probably the most important of these is per-
sonnel since the outcome of reference laboratory reporting is
largely dependent on the will of the involved personnel to
make the system succeed. This highlights the need to assure
acceptance of electronic reporting by everyone involved in
the planning stages (22). Obtaining support and guidance for
the system from organizations representing reporting sites
can also encourage acceptance by participating laboratories.
For example, APHL was instrumental in developing and
implementing electronic reporting from state public health
laboratories in the United States (9). During the initial
phases, CDC was in constant contact with APHL to deter-
mine system specifications and resolve data issues.
Funding resources can vary greatly by reporting site
(6,11,22-24). In the United States, state public health labora-
tory resources are not consistent, ranging from the under-
funded state laboratory with outdated computers to the
highly funded laboratory with state-of-the-art computer
equipment and networks. In the public health community,
competition for funding is strong; in some instances, organi-
zations with the most resources can prepare the most effec-
tive funding proposals, thereby obtaining more funds than
those with more urgent needs. Similarly, in developing coun-
tries, resources to replace antiquated equipment for basic
laboratory functions may not exist, and establishing elec-
tronic reporting may be impossible (24). Obtaining hardware
for a laboratory system may depend on external funding (22).
Table 1. Comparison of paper-based vs. electronic reporting
systems for addressing specific surveillance components
Surveillance 
component
Paper system Electronic system
Data input Questionnaire Data input/import
Reporting Mail delivery Electronic 
transmission
Processing Coding, editing, 
storage, input
Maintaining 
reporting sites
Analysis; 
interpretation
Merging data;
trend analysis
Cluster detection; 
trend analysis
Feedback Periodic reports Electronic feedback
For implementing a network hub, resources must be allo-
cated for hardware, software, and personnel. Creating such
networks may be very valuable in terms of increased fre-
quency and speed of communication among participants and
greater ease of data sharing. 
The workload of laboratories in the United States and
other countries is overwhelming, and data management and
reporting are considered less urgent than simply meeting
the day-to-day demands. Thus, system designers need to
minimize additional work while demonstrating added value.
Rapid reporting of public health laboratory data also
imposes additional burdens on epidemiologic resources. As
clusters are detected electronically, epidemiologic assess-
ments are needed and interventions are often necessary (5),
further increasing workloads.
High-Quality Data at All System Points 
Electronic laboratory reporting provides the opportunity
for large numbers of records to populate a database rapidly,
regardless of data quality. Changes in data origin, acquisi-
tion, and reporting practices at reporting sites may remain
invisible to the receiving sites. Such variations may cause
subtle data misrepresentations, which can adversely affect
data quality and cause public health officials to take errone-
ous action. Recently, for example, an unusual number of mul-
tiresistant pathogens were electronically reported to CDC in
a single week. The report caused concern and prompted
immediate public health action in the belief that a dangerous
statewide outbreak was occurring. Further data evaluation
revealed a data entry error by untrained personnel at the
site of origin. This example highlights the need for constant
evaluation of data by trained personnel at both reporting
and receiving sites. 
Multinational surveillance centers face even more such
issues, since data quality varies from country to country. One
benefit of having these centers would be to improve a coun-
try’s existing infrastructure or assist in building one suffi-
cient to provide quality data. Long-term surveillance
benefits are much greater when electronic reporting systems
use the established public health infrastructure rather than
bypassing it (19,25). Systems bypassing public health infra-
structures will likely have data of no higher quality than
those reported through official channels.
CAREC is an example of a multicenter international
organization that has taken a leadership role in improving
infrastructure in participating countries. The 21 CAREC
member countries vary dramatically in their public health
laboratory resources. CAREC has been instrumental in pro-
viding hardware, software, and training to these laborato-
ries. A week-long training workshop on laboratory reporting
that CAREC conducted for member country epidemiologists
and laboratorians strengthened the laboratory data manage-
ment infrastructure and led to a greater commitment to elec-
tronic reporting.
Balancing International Data Sharing
and Country Sovereignty 
Each country should maintain jurisdiction over its data
and the extent to which data originating within its borders
are distributed and published. Political and economic issues
concerning data reporting for surveillance purposes should
not be overlooked. The consequence of a regional center’s dis-Perspectives
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closing data outside a country while a serious disease prob-
lem is occurring within the country might be economically
and politically devastating. For example, a report of a food-
associated disease can prevent acceptance of food products
exported from the country and may inflict havoc on its tour-
ism industry (14,26). Local participants in an electronic sur-
veillance system should be notified immediately if the
national site detects an unusual cluster in the area.
Considering the sensitive nature of some disease prob-
lems, a two-pronged international public health surveillance
network would be acceptable in many places and is often
used, i.e., a formal surveillance network and an informal
communications network (12,13,27-29). The formal network
comprises information in the public domain that is open via
authorized access and might include controlled access by the
public. The informal network, providing information and
data summaries not appropriate for public knowledge but
needed to alert appropriate public health officials about
potential (possibly unconfirmed) disease problems, serves a
restricted group of users and is open only to key public
health officials participating in the surveillance effort. The
formal network provides the public with limited information
that has been confirmed and is considered correct and final,
and the informal network, based on possibly preliminary and
incomplete data, serves the function of quietly alerting
national officials about a potential disease problem outside
their country that might affect their own population. Such a
strategy must have exceptions or be modified in some situa-
tions. For example, a PAHO subregional center (20) may pro-
vide laboratory services for member countries that do not
individually have resources to perform these functions. In
this case, the data flow is reversed, since data from individ-
ual countries are generated at the center’s laboratory (e.g.,
by Salmonella serotyping) instead of being reported to the
center. The center is responsible for analyzing the data and
rapidly returning appropriate results to the country. The
center and the individual country become coowners of the
data, but their responsibilities differ: The center is responsi-
ble for sending data and analysis results to the country; the
country is responsible for interpreting the results and acting
appropriately.
Clearly, an information international network has the
benefit of providing public health officials a worldwide per-
spective on disease trends and international outbreaks. This
in turn provides the mechanism for public health officials to
rapidly identify worldwide problems and take international
action to prevent further spread of disease.
 Strong Leadership
Because the topic of disease surveillance can be politi-
cally sensitive, adding electronic reference laboratory report-
ing tends to raise political interest (6,18). Competing
organizations within the public health system may have con-
flicting interests that hinder effective implementation of
electronic systems. These issues should be identified in the
planning phase; personnel representing different interests
should participate in the planning and consensus on key
issues. Even so, internal issues will arise that can substan-
tially diminish efforts to implement an effective system.
Leaders in the planning process should be persons or organi-
zations knowledgeable about electronic systems, focused on
the goals and purposes of surveillance, and able to resolve
conflicting viewpoints.
In the United States, CDC in conjunction with CSTE is
integrating the numerous approaches now used to report the
list of notifiable and reportable diseases. Although the list
itself is a unifying point of agreement among the state and
federal governments (30), approaches to building databases
for these reports vary widely, as do solutions for how dis-
eases should be reported (23). By assuming the leadership
and problem-solving roles and pursuing a collective effort to
integrate these approaches, these groups anticipate reducing
the reporting burden at local, state, and federal levels (31). 
Components of Successful Electronic Reporting 
A successful electronic surveillance system has many
components. Surveillance systems and software for surveil-
lance are not equivalent. The following items should be con-
sidered in initiating such a system.
Authority
Public health reference laboratory reporting should be
supported from the highest office with the authority to man-
date public health offices and officials to participate (6,22)
(e.g., Ministry of Health). Without the mandate of official
authority (including funding and infrastructure), surveil-
lance systems may be built but operate successfully for only
a short time. In a multinational surveillance system, all par-
ticipating countries should have such a clear mandate; it
should not be assumed. 
Standardizing Disease Definitions
Standardizing disease definitions among reporting sites
is a critical component for data analysis. This role is taken
by the central receiving site (32). The public health commu-
nity has developed standards for use in case and laboratory
electronic reporting (33-35); these could be implemented in
international reference laboratories and clinical laboratories.
In some international communities, the public health refer-
ence laboratory may also serve as the clinical laboratory.
Although data about cases can be standardized by care-
fully constructed disease definitions, standardization of labo-
ratory data may be more difficult because data quality is
affected by the variability of laboratory competency, meth-
ods, workload, equipment, and other factors. Periodic quality
checks of laboratory procedures may help increase data qual-
ity. 
Planning
Planning is a critical component in setting up a refer-
ence laboratory surveillance system. Identifying system
stakeholders (both laboratory and epidemiology) is often a
first step. Hosting a stakeholders’ planning meeting can pro-
vide a means to address and define system goals, objectives,
business rules, functions, and surveillance approaches (e.g.,
sentinel vs. comprehensive). These meetings also provide an
avenue to evaluate and plan for political and technical issues
surrounding integration; a workable timetable for system
implementation including system pilot testing; data confi-
dentiality, ownership, and dissemination rights at all report-
ing sites; quality control assessment; identification ofPerspectives
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personnel for system management; and creation of a system
help desk. 
Data Elements
Data collected for surveillance differ from research data.
Surveillance should provide the minimum necessary data
fields to understand the current disease situation. The ten-
dency to ask for data about every factor potentially related to
each disease condition should be curtailed, as it will burden
both the plan and reporters.
System Support
Initially, a support plan may be developed for each site
to address personnel turnover, personnel responsibilities,
and backup procedures. After reporting has begun, all sys-
tem users should have a point of contact for problem solving.
If the central reporting site is also the developer of the sur-
veillance software, user-support personnel fill this role and
can be a continuing resource for identifying needs for future
enhancements. User groups can also be a means for system
or software developers to receive system specifications and
enhancements. Support personnel for electronic reporting
can be generally grouped according to function (Table 2).
Although numbers of persons will vary, personnel perform-
ing each function should be specifically identified (6,21,36).
In some settings, one person may be assigned more than one
task. When a data transmission system is down and surveil-
lance is interrupted, resources and support should be avail-
able at each site to make system recovery immediate (6).
Delays can deliver an implicit message to participants that
timeliness is not important
The responsibility for analyzing electronically reported
data and returning results rapidly to the reporting sites may
be specifically designated. The complexity of analysis and
volume of data will determine the need for statistical, pro-
gramming, and epidemiologic resources (36). At the central
receiving site, these resources should be allocated in the ini-
tial planning stage and should not be diverted to other areas
after its implementation. 
The support structure in state and international public
health laboratories varies according to the funding and the
complexity of the data management system. For example, in
smaller laboratories with limited computer resources, one
person may serve many roles (e.g., site supervisor, data man-
ager, programmer). In a larger laboratory (the central receiv-
ing site), many people perform these roles. In CDC’s Division
of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases (in which approximately
100,000 isolates per year are reported electronically) one
computer programmer, one epidemiologist, one statistician,
and one health communicator are actively involved with
data analysis, system support, and feedback to 100 reporting
sites.
Assessing Country Readiness
Assessing a country’s readiness for electronic surveil-
lance before a system is implemented involves many ele-
ments. The existing laboratory infrastructure should be
evaluated to ensure commitment to the project. Potential
participating laboratories (reporting sites) should also be
evaluated to determine technical capabilities and require-
ments (e.g., access to an Internet service provider, access to
deicated quality phone lines, computer knowledge, determi-
nation of hardware requirements, and availability of com-
puter maintenance support). Assessment of professional
staff support to determine political concerns (e.g., data shar-
ing between laboratory and epidemiology sites), and evalua-
tion of staff personnel requirements to provide effective
maintenance of surveillance are also important. Ongoing
ources of financial and political support should be contacted
to determine if long-term commitment to the surveillance
system exists among those in authority to support the
projects.
 Site Selection and Cooperation
Each public health site has a different surveillance envi-
ronment, with varying levels of interest and expertise as
well as differing perspectives about surveillance and soft-
ware tools, funding levels and sources, political atmospheres,
and disease problems affecting daily workloads. Such differ-
ences should not be overlooked in enlisting sites.
The central site should coordinate selection of reporting
sites on the basis of what they can contribute to the surveil-
lance effort and their desire to participate. Persons at the
Table 2. Functional roles in electronic laboratory reporting for
surveillance
Functional rolea Location Functions
Central system 
administrator
Central receiving 
site
Coordinate sites’ 
uses of system; 
train site 
supervisors; define 
users to system; 
solve problems; 
distribute 
upgrades; expand 
system for new 
diseases
Site supervisor Reporting site Define users to 
system; train 
subordinate site 
supervisors; solve 
problems; 
distribute 
upgrades; expand 
system for new 
diseases
Technical resource Central receiving 
site
Reporting site
Resolve hardware 
and 
communications 
problems
Data manager Central receiving 
site
Reporting site
Input or import 
data; receive data 
from subordinate 
sites; review data 
for quality; export 
data for analysis
Programmer Central receiving 
site
Reporting site 
(optional)
Perform 
programming tasks 
for data analysis 
and feedback
Statistician Central receiving 
site
Reporting site 
(optional)
Perform analyses 
and  consult with 
epidemiologists
Epidemiologist Central receiving 
site
Reporting site 
(optional)
Interpret analyses 
with statistician 
and laboratorians; 
take appropriate 
actions
aMore than one task may be assigned to each person.Perspectives
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central receiving level who have particular interest and
knowledge about the disease should enlist the appropriate
sites, provide definitions and consultation, and assist in out-
break or other investigations. At CDC, each implementation
of a new laboratory reporting module (a set of specifications
for each reporting condition) is spearheaded by an epidemiol-
ogist with close assistance of technical staff. Electronic
reporting will benefit substantially when two persons with
distinct job functions work together to prepare reporting
sites. For example, having epidemiologists prepare personnel
at the participating sites for their expected role in the sys-
tem before contact is made by the technical support team
should help to ensure that site epidemiologists and laborato-
rians have been given adequate specifications and that the
capabilities of the site to participate have been determined.
Site Preparation and Training
 As each reporting site joins the electronic reporting sys-
tem, all persons participating at that site should be trained
to perform the duties associated with surveillance and the
system tools (11,22,36). Various approaches to system train-
ing may be used.
In one approach, trainers from the central site visit the
reporting sites to train laboratorians and epidemiologists to
use the system and assist with issues specific to their envi-
ronments. This strategy was demonstrated in PAHO-spon-
sored electronic laboratory training conferences in Trinidad,
Venezuela, and Argentina. Although it involves substantial
travel costs to the central site, more people are usually
trained than if each site sends personnel to the central
receiving site, and the training is conducted in the reporting
site's environment. 
A second approach is for participants from reporting
sites to visit the central receiving site for training, as
occurred when personnel from the Ireland Food Safety
Authority visited CDC for training. This approach is efficient
for the central receiving site because training can be coordi-
nated into a single large session without incurring travel
time. 
A third hybrid of these approaches, especially appropri-
ate in the international setting, provides a training work-
shop at the central site attended by representatives from the
reporting sites and follow-up with onsite training. Bringing a
group together at the central site creates an environment
that induces interactions among participants that may not
likely occur otherwise. All these approaches, however, have a
common goal: to train people who can then train others at
their sites. 
Often, initial training is lost as the organization experi-
ences personnel turnover, system enhancements, or infre-
quent use of the system. The central receiving site may want
to be alert to signs that retraining might be needed. A plan
could be devised initially to provide training to representa-
tives from all sites, follow-up to ensure that the training was
effective, and retraining when necessary. 
Software/Hardware Distribution
Often, surveillance systems are funded in part by the
central receiving site (24) or by sources outside the public
health domain. Hardware provided by these sources may
arrive at sites with no provisions for its disposition. The sup-
port team should ensure that equipment from either source
arrives at the correct location and is tested and operational,
that software is properly installed, and that equipment is not
diverted to another project.
Software selection presents additional considerations.
Software designed for collecting and reporting data about
only a single disease can be designed in every detail to
accommodate the needs for that particular surveillance
effort. However, the broader perspective for surveillance will
embrace software that is designed for multiple disease
reporting purposes and that can be easily adapted for many
different environments and reporting requirements. In
either case, software should be regarded by its users as easy
to use and comprehensive in its functions (8). The tendency
is to begin laboratory reporting by shopping for software that
might perform data management without concern about sur-
veillance goals. Rather, one may want to select software on
the basis of the functions it can bring to the system (10,15).
If a software package has been developed and successfully
implemented for laboratory reporting, then implementation
or modification of existing software may be more efficient. 
Pilot Test
Successful laboratory implementations (9) include a
pilot phase in which questionnaires, equipment, and person-
nel are tested. Pilot phases ensure that data being reported
from sites meet system specifications. Later, as new disease
conditions are added to the system, they should also be
tested.
Problems identified during the pilot testing phase can
range widely—from poor software performance, communica-
tion problems, and data issues to funding and resource prob-
lems. Each problem should be addressed and its solution
retested before actual reporting is begun. In the United
States, pilot testing of the reporting system was done in five
state public health laboratories. When problems reported to
CDC were resolved, these laboratories were able to assume a
leadership role in implementing the system in other state
laboratories.
 Feedback
Often, surveillance systems are dependent on voluntary
or mandatory reporting without compensation (34). To
assure that the system's value is recognized, central receiv-
ing sites should provide meaningful feedback to the report-
ing sites (18). Feedback should provide information needed
by the sites and stimulate sites to input data in a timely way.
Feedback on recent trends and current multisite clusters of
disease should take precedence over bulky reports and
detailed tabulations, which, although useful for fiscal
accounting or periodic disease assessment, provide little
incentive for timely reporting. 
Summary
Our experience with implementing electronic public
health laboratory data management and reporting systems
in the United States and with working with international
organizations to initiate similar efforts demonstrates that
successful reference laboratory reporting can be imple-
mented if surveillance issues and components are ade-
quately planned for. The public health can benefit when data
arrive at analysis sites so rapidly that outbreaks can be
detected, responses initiated, and interventions imple-Perspectives
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mented in time to prevent cases that would otherwise have
occurred. Resources focused on an electronic reporting sys-
tems for public health laboratories and efforts to sustain the
system are worthwhile when the system rapidly makes data
available to describe current disease situations. Initiating
electronic reporting opens a new paradigm for conducting
surveillance—one that is highly challenging but increasingly
necessary.
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